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Abstract
We model an industry in which a discrete number of rms choose
the output of their di¤erentiated products deciding whether or not to
consider the impact of their decisions on aggregate output. We show
that two threshold numbers of rms exist such that: below the lower
one there is a unique equilibrium in which all rms consider their ag-
gregate impact as in standard oligopoly; above the higher threshold
there is a unique equilibrium in which all rms disregard that impact
as in standard monopolistic competition; between the two thresholds
there are two equilibria, one in which all rms consider their aggregate
impact and the other in which they do not. We then show that our
model of strategic inattention is isomorphic to a model of strate-
gic delegationwith managerial compensation based on relative prot
performance.
Keywords: information; strategic interaction; monopolistic competi-
tion; oligopoly; delegation.
JEL Codes: D43, L13.
Contacts: (a)University of Catania, cellini@unict.it; (b)University of Bologna,
luca.lambertini@unibo.it, gianmarco.ottaviano@unibo.it; (c)London School of Economics,
g.i.ottaviano@lse.ac.uk. We would like to thank Herbert Dawid, Stephen Martin, Juan
Prieto Rodriguez, Jacques-Francois Thisse as well as participants at various seminars for
useful comments and suggestions on a previous draft. The usual disclaimer applies.
1
1 Introduction
Oligopoly models à la Cournot assume that rms choose their output levels
considering the impact of their individual choices on overall industry out-
put. In monopolistic competition models rms are assumed to take, instead,
industry output as given. With a continuum of rms this assumption is in-
consequential as there is no individual impact on the industry. Di¤erently,
with a discrete number of rms each rm does have an individual impact
on the industry, but monopolistic competition models make the behavioral
assumption that the rm neglects this piece of information.
A common way to justify this neglect is to argue that, for some purposes,
monopolistic competition provides a convenient approximation to the exact
Cournot equilibrium when there is a large numberof rms so that the indi-
vidual impact of any of them on the industry can be considered negligible in
practice (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). This justication has been criticized as
being both mathematically inconsistent (see, e.g., Keen and Standish, 2006)
and not necessarily innocuous in terms of approximating the correct market
outcome (see, e.g., dAspremont et al., 1996). Be that as it may, the large
numberx is widely used and probably all that could be said on its impli-
cations has already been said. What has not been discussed yet is, instead,
another natural but very di¤erent justication of why a discrete number of
rms may disregard the impact of their individual choices on aggregate out-
put: there might well be circumstances in which a rms prot maximizing
choice is indeed to strategically neglect that piece of information so that an
industry equilibrium emerges in which a discrete number of rms choose to
behave as monopolistic competitors rather than as oligopolists. The aim of
this paper is to ll the gap by characterizing those circumstances in a partial
equilibrium model of an industry in which oligopolistic or monopolistically
competitive market structures arise endogenously in equilibrium from rms
decisions on strategic inattention.
Specically, we consider an industry in which a discrete number of rms
supply horizontally di¤erentiated products. Demand is linear in quantity
consumed and total cost is quadratic in the quantity produced. Firms are
single-product prot-maximizers and play a non-cooperative two-stage game.
In the rst stage, they simultaneously decide whether or not to use informa-
tion that industry output equals the sum of their individual outputs. In the
second stage, they choose their output levels based on information that in the
rst stage they decided to use. If they decided to consider their individual
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impact on industry output, in the second stage market structure corresponds
to a familiar Cournot oligopoly. If they chose instead to neglect that impact,
in the second stage market structure corresponds to familiar monopolistic
competition.
In equilibrium, either or both alternative market structures may emerge,
depending on the values of demand and cost parameters, and crucially on the
number of rms. For a given number of rms, high (low) product di¤erenti-
ation and weak (strong) negative reaction of marginal cost to scale give rise
to a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies characterized by
oligopoly (monopolistic competition); an oligopolistic and a monopolistically
competitive subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies coexist, instead,
for intermediate product di¤erentiation and moderate reaction of marginal
cost to scale. For given demand and cost parameters, oligopoly (monopolis-
tic competition) arises in the subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies
when the number of rms is low (large) while an oligopolistic and a monopo-
listically competitive subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies coexist for
an intermediate number of rms. The outcome in which some rms behave
as oligopolists and others as monopolistic competitors never arises in a sub-
game perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. We show that it may, however,
emerge in a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies.
It is important to stress the di¤erence between these results and the tra-
ditional view of monopolistic competition as an approximation to the exact
oligopolistic equilibrium when market structure is given and there is a large
numberof rms. Our novel insight is that for a wide range of parameter val-
ues monopolistic competition emerges as theequilibrium market structure
when rms can decide to strategically neglect the aggregate impact of their
choices. Indeed, the set of parameter values for which monopolistic compe-
tition is the only equilibrium market structure is much wider than the set
for which oligopoly is the only one. We also show that, rather than being a
mere intellectual curiosity, a rms strategic neglect of its individual impact
on the industry is implied by a simple realistic managerial contract based
on Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE), in which rms benchmark their
managersperformance in terms of own prot against rivalsaverage prot
(see, e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999).
Our analysis contributes to four strands of literature. First, a key feature
of our model is that the market regime (oligopoly or monopolistic competi-
tion) is determined endogenously by the strategic choices of rms. In this
respect, our analysis is related to the literature on endogenous market struc-
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ture. In this literature what is endogenous is the number of competing rms
with a focus on their entry and exit decisions in an oligopolistic setting (see,
e.g., Etro, 2008, 2011, 2012; Dunne et al., 2013). This focus on entry and
exit is also the hallmark of old and new models of monopolistic competi-
tion (see, e.g., Spence, 1976; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Ottaviano et al., 2002;
Behrens and Murata, 2007). With respect to all these works, we take the
reverse angle. Keeping the number of rms xed, we study how oligopoly
or monopolistic competition endogenously arise in equilibrium from the deci-
sions of rms to use or ignore the aggregate impact of their individual output
choices.
Second, in our model information on a rms individual impact on the
aggregate is freely accessible. Still, it can be individually convenient for a
rm to ignore that piece of information, which therefore has negative value
for the rm. In this respect, our analysis contributes to the literature on the
value of information in games. Kamien et al. (1990), Bassan et al. (1997)
and Bassan et al. (2003) are all examples showing that information is not
relevant per se, but rather for the way it a¤ects playersbest replies to ri-
vals. Similarly, Kadane et al. (1996) show that a Bayesian agent may nd
it rational to pay not to see some pieces of information. Safra and Sugarik
(1993) make a similar point for cases in which agents do not choose according
to the expected utility principle. In Barros (1997), by ignoring information
on the actions taken by their (sale) agents, oligopolistic principals forgo the
possibility of appropriating the agentsbenets from their relation specic
investments, which ends up increasing the principalsexpected prots. Dif-
ferently from these works, we investigate the strategic benets rms may
enjoy from ignoring pieces of available information concerning their interde-
pendence. Lastly, limited ability to process information has also been used
to explain why agents may not make full use of available information. For
example, in rational inattentionmodels available information is not used
because agentsability to translate information into action is assumed to be
constrained by a nite capacityto process information (see, e.g., Sims, 2010,
for a survey). In our model information is freely processable, so processing
capacity is not an issue and inattention arises, instead, from strategic behav-
ior.
Third, in our model whether all rms or only a subset of them decide
to consider or to ignore their individual impact on aggregate output is an
endogenous outcome. In this respect, our analysis also speaks to the studies
on the interactions among asymmetricrms that may di¤er along several
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dimensions such as size, objectives and organization. Chirco et al. (2013)
provide a review of theoretical, empirical, and experimental works supporting
the coexistence of heterogeneous motives for rms in an oligopolistic market,
with specic attention to the delegation of market operations to managers.
More directly connected to our paper, Kokovin et al. (2014) present a model
in which oligopolistic and monopolistically competitive rms interact simul-
taneously in markets with di¤erentiated products. In their model, however,
the asymmetry across rms is given and linked to exogenous di¤erences in
rm size, with large oligopolists interacting with a fringe of small monopolis-
tic competitors (see, also, Shimomura and Thisse, 2012). In the same vein,
Anderson et al. (2013) develop and use the concept of aggregative gameto
analyze the free entry of rms in markets where oligopolistic and monopo-
listically competitive producers coexist. Di¤erently from these works, we do
not assume that exogenous di¤erences in rm size determine whether or not
rms ignore their individual impacts on aggregate outcomes.
Fourth and last, we contribute to the literature on strategic delegation
games. In our model the rst-stage choice of neglecting information on the
aggregate impact of individual output supports more aggressive production
decisions in the second stage. The idea that decisions made in the rst
stage of a game can be used to commit to more aggressive behavior in the
second stage has a long tradition in oligopoly models. In particular, from
a mathematical point of view, the problem our rms solve closely resembles
the strategic choice of delegation contracts to managers analyzed by Vickers
(1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987), Fumas (1992), Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999) and Miller and Pazgal (2001) among others. We show
that the conditions that dictate the emergence of oligopoly or monopolistic
competition as equilibrium market structures in our game are the same that
support strategic delegation to managers through a simple realistic RPE
contract (see, e.g., Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Murphy, 1999).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model, characterizes its subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies for an
arbitrary number of rms, and discusses comparative statics with respect to
demand and cost parameters as well as to the number of rms. Second 3
zooms in for a close-up of the two-rm case to provide an intuitive discus-
sion of our ndings and a characterization of subgame perfect equilibria in
mixed strategies. Section 4 investigates the formal connections between our
results and those in the literature on strategic delegation through managerial
contracts. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
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2 A Model of Strategic Inattention
Consider an industry in which n single-product rms (indexed h = 1; :::; n)
sell n horizontally di¤erentiated products facing linear inverse demand
ph = a  qh   Q; (1)
where ph and qh are the price and the output level of rm h, while Q =Pn
h=1 qh is industry output.
1 Total cost is assumed to be a quadratic function
of output:
ch = cqh + bq
2
h:
While the demand parameters are assumed to be positive, the cost parame-
ters are assumed to be non-negative with c < a.2 To make future expressions
less cumbersome, it is useful to dene the following positive bundling para-
meters
  a  c
 + b
,   
 + b
,    + b
so that the prot of rm i can be written as
h =  (  qh   Q) qh: (2)
where all parameters are again positive. Among them, as we will see, the
key parameter will turn out to be . This measures the impact of aggre-
gate output Q on the rms prot margin h=qh relative to the impact of
own output qh. Equivalently, it measures the (absolute value of the) change
in qh needed to keep the prot margin unchanged for a given change in Q.
Intuitively,  measures the dependence of the rms prot on the industry
aggregate. In the limit case  = 0 the rms prot is independent from aggre-
gate output. As  grows, the rms prot increasingly depend on aggregate
output. Hence, we call  the aggregate dependenceparameter. In the case
of constant marginal cost (b = 0),  is a pure demand parameter inversely
1In the case of a discrete number of rms, (1) corresponds to the demand function rst
introduced by Bowley (1924) and then revisited, inter alia, by Spence (1976), Dixit (1979)
and Singh and Vives (1984). Ottaviano et al. (2002) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)
have adapted it to the case of a continuum of rms.
2We assume linear demands because this specication yields straightforward com-
parative statics. In light of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), the results in this section
can be generalized to nonlinear demand functions as long as @ph(qh; Q)=@qh < 0 and
@ph(qh; Q)=@Q < 0.
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measuring the extent of product di¤erentiation: stronger product di¤eren-
tiation implies lower aggregate dependence. With increasing marginal cost
(b > 0), aggregate dependence is also a¤ected by the gradient of marginal
cost.
Market structure is endogenized by assuming that rms play a two-stage
game, with both stages characterised by complete, symmetric and imperfect
information. In the second stage, rms h = 1; :::; n simultaneously maximize
prot h with respect to their output level qh. In the rst stage, they simul-
taneously decide whether in the second-stage prot maximization they will
take the condition Q =
Pn
i=h qh into account or they will rather consider Q as
a given parameter. We look for subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies
focusing on symmetric outcomes.
2.1 Second Stage: How Much Output
Solving backwards, we start with the second stage and consider a generic
composition of the industry in which k rms have decided to neglect the
aggregate impact of their individual output choices and n   k rms have
decided to consider it. For parsimony, we call the former myopicand the
latter smart. Industry output can then be expressed as
Q =
kX
i=1
qmi +
nX
j=k+1
qsj (3)
where qmi is the output of myopic rm i with i = 1; :::; k and q
s
j is the output
of smart rm j with j = k + 1; :::; n.
Given (2), the FOC for prot maximization by a smart rm is
@si
@qsi
=  [  (2 + ) qsi   Q] = 0; (4)
with SOC satised for all parameter values.
After imposing symmetry qmi = q
m for all i = 1; :::; k and qsj = q
s for
all j = k + 1; :::; n, (3) becomes Q = kqm + (n   k)qs and thus (4) can be
rewritten as
  [2 +  (n  k + 1)] qs   kqm = 0: (5)
Analogously, the FOC by a myopic rm is
@i
@qi
=  (  2qmi   Q) = 0; (6)
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with SOC satised for all parameter values. Using (3) with symmetry, (6)
can be rewritten as
  (2 + k) qm    (n  k) qs = 0: (7)
Conditions (5) and (7) together imply that the equilibrium output levels of
smart and myopic rms are
qs(k; n) =
2
4 + 2 (n+ 1) + 2k
(8)
and
qm(k; n) =
(2 + )
4 + 2 (n+ 1) + 2k
(9)
respectively, with equilibrium industry output
Q =
(2n+ k)
4 + 2 (n+ 1) + 2k
: (10)
These expressions show that industry output increases with the number of
rms (n) and the fraction of them that are myopic (k) whereas individual
output falls with both n and k. They also shows that myopic rms are
bigger (qm(k; n) > qs(k; n)), the more so the larger the aggregate dependence
parameter .
Substituting (8) and (9) in (2) gives equilibrium prots
s (k; n) =
42 (1 + )
[4 + 2 (n+ 1) + 2k]2
(11)
and
m (k; n) =
2 (2 + )2
[4 + 2 (n+ 1) + 2k]2
; (12)
which reveal that myopic rms not only supply more output but also earn
higher prot. Hence, neglecting their individual impact on industry output,
for given n and k myopic rms behave more aggressively in terms of output
and this pays in terms of prot.
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2.2 First Stage: To Know or Not To Know
In the rst stage, rms simultaneously decide whether in the second stage
they will be myopic or smart. Given n rms, there exists a subgame perfect
equilibrium partition fk; n  kg in which k myopic rms coexist with n  k
smart rms if and only if no myopic rm has a unilateral incentive to become
smart because
s (k   1; n)  m (k; n) < 0 (13)
and no smart rm has an incentive to become myopic because
m (k + 1; n)  s (k; n) < 0: (14)
The following result holds:
Lemma 1 Consider an industry in which n rms compete by choosing the
output levels of their di¤erentiated products. In making this choice, rms
can decide whether or not to take the impact of their individual choices on
aggregate output into account. Then, no subgame perfect equilibrium in pure
strategies exists in which some rms take the aggregate impact of their indi-
vidual choices into account while others do not (0 < k < n).
Proof. Consider any given partition fk; n  kg with k 2 (0; n). Given (11)
and (12), condition (13) is satised if and only if
k   1 > 2 (2 + )
p
 + 1  2 (n  1)
2
;
while condition (14) is satised if and only if
0 < k <
2 (2 + )
p
 + 1  2 (n  1)
2
:
Hence, (11) and (12) cannot be satised at the same time and for all para-
meter values either a smart or a myopic rm has a unilateral incentive to
deviate from fk; n  kg.
Then, we can prove:
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Proposition 2 Consider an industry in which n rms compete by choosing
the output levels of their di¤erentiated products. In making this choice, rms
can decide whether or not to take the impact of their individual choices on
aggregate output into account. Dene nL  1 + 2
p
 + 1 and nH  1 +
1 + 2

p
 + 1. Then, for 1 < n < nL there exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in pure strategies in which all rms take the aggregate impact of
their individual choices into account (k = 0). For n > nH there exists a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in which all rms do
not take the aggregate impact of their individual choices into account (k = n).
For nL  n  nH there are two subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies,
one in which all rms take the aggregate impact of their individual choices
into account and the other in which all rms do not.
Proof. Consider rst the partition fk; n  kg = f0; ng in which all rms
take the aggregate impact of their individual choices into account. Unilateral
deviation from this fully smartoutcome pays if and only if the prot of a
single myopic rm is larger than any rms prot when all rms are smart.
Formally, this happens for
m (1; n)  s (0; n) > 0
with (11) and (12) implying
m (1; n)  s (0; n) = 22 8 + n
22   42   3   2n2   4
( + n + 2)2 (2 + 2n + 2 + 4)2
:
This expression is positive if and only if its numerator is positive, which is
the case for
n  1 >

1 +
2

p
 + 1:
Consider now the partition fk; n  kg = fn; 0g in which all rms do not take
the aggregate impact of their individual choices into account. Unilateral
deviation from this fully myopicoutcome pays if and only if the prot of a
single smart rm is larger than the prot of any rms prot when all rms
are myopic. The di¤erence between these prots corresponds to
s (n  1; n)  m (n; n) = 22 4   n
22   2 + 2n2 + 4
(n + 2)2 (2 + 2n   2 + n2 + 4)2 :
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This expression is positive if and only if its numerator is positive, which is
the case for
0 < n  1 < 2

p
 + 1:
Hence, for 0 < n 1 < 2

p
 + 1 unilateral deviation from fk; n  kg = fn; 0g
pays whereas unilateral deviation from fk; n  kg = f0; ng does not, and for
n   1 >

1 + 2

p
 + 1 unilateral deviation from fk; n  kg = f0; ng pays
whereas unilateral deviation from fk; n  kg = fn; 0g does not. Together
with Lemma 1, this implies the results stated in the proposition, if one denes
nL  1 + 2
p
 + 1 and nH  1 +

1 + 2

p
 + 1.
Based on Proposition 2, only two equilibrium market structures exist.
The rst is monopolistic competition, in which all rms are myopic with
rm output and prot respectively equal to
qm(n; n) =

2 + n
and m (n; n) =
2
(2 + n)2
. (15)
The second is oligopoly, in which all rms are smart with output and prot
respectively equal to
qs(0; n) =

2 +  (n+ 1)
and s (0; n) =
2 (1 + )
[2 +  (n+ 1)]2
. (16)
Comparing (15) and (16) shows that rms are bigger in terms of output but
earn smaller prot under monopolistic competition than under oligopoly.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the parametrical condi-
tions supporting the three alternative outcomes described in Proposition 2
with n on the vertical axis and  on the horizontal one. The two downward
sloping curves depict nL and nH as functions of  with the former lying below
the latter. These curves partition the parameter space in three areas. Above
nH the unique subgame perfect equilibrium features only myopic rms. Be-
low nL, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium features only smart rms.
Between the nL and nH there are two subgame perfect equilibria in which all
rms are either myopic or smart. Hence, large n and large  support monop-
olistic competition as the unique equilibrium market structure whereas small
n and small  support oligopoly as the unique equilibrium market struc-
ture. For intermediate value of n and  both monopolistic competition and
oligopoly are equilibrium market structures.
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The gure shows that, for any given degree of aggregate dependence ,
there exists a threshold number of rms above which monopolistic competi-
tion is an equilibrium market structure. This number is the closest integer
to nL from above and need not be very large except for very small values
of . For instance, it equals 22 for  = 0:1, 9 for  = 0:3, 6 for  = 0:5,
and 5 for  = 0:9. Moreover, for any given , there also exists a threshold
number of rms above which monopolistic competition emerges as the unique
equilibrium market structure. This number is the closest integer to nH from
above and need not be very large except for very small or very large values
of . For instance, it equals 24 for  = 0:1, 10 for  = 0:3, 8 for  = 0:5, 5
for  = 0:9 and does not rise back to 24 until around  = 500. Note that
this is very di¤erent from saying that in the limit monopolistic competition
approximatesoligopoly as n goes to innity. Instead, for n > nH monopo-
listic competition is theequilibrium outcome rather than its approximation.
Note also that the minimum of the nH curve corresponds to  = 1+
p
5 im-
plying nH = 4:3302 so that n  5 is a necessary condition for monopolistic
competition to be the unique equilibrium market structure.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
0
5
10
15
20
eta
n
Figure 1. Oligopoly vs. Monopolistic Competition
12
3 The Two Firms Case
To further discuss the intuition behind Proposition 2, it is useful to focus
on the simple case of two rms. This also comes handy in showing how a
mixedmarket structure, in which some rms are myopic while others are
smart, can emerge as a subgame perfect equilibrium in mixed strategies.
3.1 The Strategic Implications of Inattention
Proposition 2 shows that monopolistic competition emerges as an equilibrium
market structure when aggregate dependence is strong (large ) and there are
many rms (large n). In both cases the prot a rm can make is inuenced
a lot by how much its competitors produce. An intuitive explanation of the
proposition can be given comparing the best repliesof smart and myopic
rms as dened by (4) and (6). However, as  and n work in the same
direction, intuition is better served by focusing on the simple case of two
rms only, indexed i and j.
Consider rst the oligopolistic market regime, in which both rms take
their individual impact on total output into account. In the case of two rms,
the FOC for rm is prot maximization becomes
@si
@qsi
= 

  2 (1 + ) qsi   qsj

= 0; (17)
which denes rm is best replyto a given qsj as the linear function
qsi =

2(1 + )
  
2(1 + )
qsj : (18)
The symmetric equilibrium output level therefore equals
qss  qs (0; 2) = 
2 + 3
;
with associated equilibrium prot
ss  s (0; 2) = 
2 (1 + )
(2 + 3)2
; (19)
where superscript ss denotes that both rms are smart.
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Next, consider the monopolistically competitive market regime, in which
both rms take Q as given. In this case, the FOC for prot maximization
becomes
@mi
@qmi
=  (  2qmi   Qm) = 

  (2 + ) qmi   qmj

= 0; (20)
where the second equality is obtained after imposing Qm = qmi + q
m
j . This
denes rm is best reply to a given qmj when it neglects its individual
impact on industry output as the linear function
qmi =

2 + 
  
2 + 
qmj : (21)
The symmetric equilibrium output level in this case equals
qmm  qm (2; 2) = 
2 (1 + )
;
with associated equilibrium prot
mm  m (2; 2) = 
2
4 (1 + )2
: (22)
where superscript mm denotes that both rms are myopic.
Comparing the best replies (18) and (21) reveals that the latter has
larger intercept and larger slope than the former. Hence, to any given out-
put level of its competitor, a rm replies by producing more when it is myopic
than when it is smart. This is why, as already discussed, a monopolistic com-
petitor is more aggressivethan an oligopolist that internalizes the indirect
impact of larger individual output on own prot through its e¤ects on indus-
try output. As a result, in the symmetric equilibrium output is larger and
prot is smaller under monopolistic competition: qmm > qss and mm < ss.
Last, consider a mixed market regime, in which rm i is smart while rm
j is myopic. The FOCs of the two rms now are:
@si
@qsi
= 

  2 (1 + ) qsi   qmj

= 0;
@mj
@qmj
= 
 
  2qmj   Q

= 0:
(23)
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These, after imposing Q = qsi + q
m
j , imply equilibrium output levels
qsm  qs (1; 2) = 2
4 + 6 + 2
and qms  qm (1; 2) =  (2 + )
4 + 6 + 2
; (24)
with associated equilibrium prots
sm  s (1; 2) = 4
2 (1 + )
(4 + 6 + 2)2
andms  m (1; 2) = 
2 (2 + )2
(4 + 6 + 2)2
(25)
for smart rm i and myopic rm j respectively. In (24) and (25) superscript
sm (ms) on a rms outcomes indicate that the rm is smart (myopic) while
its competitor is myopic (smart). It is readily veried that these expressions
imply qsm < qms and sm < ms: in equilibrium the myopic rm supplies
larger output and gains higher prot than its smart rival.
At rst sight it may seem counterintuitive that the myopic rm performs
better that the smart one, and that information has thus a negative value.
Why this happens can be, nonetheless, understood by recalling that the best
replies (18) and (21) require a myopic rm to act more aggressively than a
smart rm.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of what this implies. In
the gure qi and qj are measured along the horizontal and vertical axes
respectively. The downward sloping lines represent the rmsbest replies:
the two thin lines correspond to the case in which rms are smart; the thick
ones to case when they are myopic. The oligopoly outcome (qsi = q
s
j = q
ss)
and the monopolistic competition outcome (qmi = q
m
j = q
mm) can be found
at the crossing of the two thin lines and the two thick lines respectively. Both
crossings are on the 45-degree line passing through the origin (not drawn to
avoid cluttering the gure) where rms produce the same level of output. The
remaining two crossings involve a thin and a thick lines. They are symmetric
around the 45-degree line passing through the origin. The one above this
line entails qsi = q
sm and qmj = q
ms with qms > qsm; the other crossing is its
mirror image.
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Figure 2 Best replies: Smart vs myopic
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3.2 Mixed Strategies and Mixed Market Structure
When two equilibria exist in which all rms are either myopic or smart, the
second stage has the features of a coordination gameand thus admits a
mixed strategy equilibrium. Again, this is most readily characterized in the
case of two rms. For this case the second stage can be summarized as in
Matrix 1, where rms i and j are confronted with a choice between being
smart (s) or being myopic (m) and their payo¤s correspond to (19), (22) and
(25).
Matrix 1: The rst stage
j
s m
i s ss; ss sm; ms
m ms; sm mm; mm
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Applying Proposition 2 with n = 2, the outcome in which both rms are
smart is always a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies while the
outcome in which both rms are myopic is a subgame perfect equilibrium in
pure strategies if and only if
 > 2

1 +
p
2

: (26)
This dened the relevant interval of aggregate dependence for the existence
of a mixed strategy subgame perfect equilibrium.
Specically, dene the probabilities that rm h attaches to pure strategies
s and m as phs and phm = 1  phs respectively, with phs 2 [0; 1] and h = i; j.
Given the symmetry existing a priori between rms, we can impose pis =
pjs = ps and solve for ps the indi¤erence condition between being smart and
myopic
ps
ss + (1  ps)sm = psms + (1  ps)mm (27)
where the left (right) hand side is a rms expected prot when it is smart
(myopic). Solving (27) for ps gives the equilibrium probability
ps =
sm   mm
sm   mm + ms   ss =
(2 + 3)2 (2   4   4)
2 (16 + 44 + 332 + 43)
(28)
Accordingly, given that we have ps 2 (0; 1) as long as (26) holds, there
exists a positive probability that a rm chooses to be smart while the other
chooses to be myopic. As long as (26) holds, the probability (1   ps)2 of
the monopolistic competition outcome (mm) is larger than the probability
2ps (1  ps) of a mixed outcome (sm and ms), and this is larger than the
probability (ps)
2 of the oligopolistic outcome (ss). Moreover, as  grows,
(1 ps)2 also grows whereas 2ps (1  ps) and (ps)2 fall, with the former falling
faster than the latter. Hence, the probability di¤erentials between these three
outcomes increase when aggregate dependence increases.
4 Strategic Delegation as Strategic Inatten-
tion
Our Figure 2 looks pretty much like Figure 2 in Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999), which compares the best replies under standard di¤erentiated Cournot
duopoly with the best replies when rms owners delegate output choices to
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managers through compensation based on a linear combination of own and
rivals prots. This suggests the possible existence of a fundamental iso-
morphism between our model of strategic inattention and their models of
strategic delegation. The aim of this section is to nail down such isomor-
phism.
Consider the following delegation model. As in Section (2) there are
n rms  indexed h = 1; :::; n  that produce di¤erentiated products and
choose output so as to maximize prot. Firm owners play a two-stage game
with both stages characterised by complete, symmetric and imperfect infor-
mation. In the rst stage, rm owners simultaneously decide whether or
not to delegate prot maximization to managers. In the second stage, rms
simultaneously maximize prot with respect to output.
Delegation can be implemented through a simple and realistic Relative
Performance Evaluation (RPE) contract in which the manager of a rm is re-
warded (penalized) for prot above (below) industry average.3 This assumes
that the managers action choice at the second stage is not contractible,
whereas prots are contractible.4 Specically, rm h can o¤er its manager
compensation
wh = kh + h   
where kh is a constant unrelated to performance optimally chosen by the
rms owners and
 
Pn
z=1 z
n
is average industry prot. We assume that the managerial labor market is
competitive and managers have a reservation wage w0.
Solving backwards, if rm owners decide not to delegate, the second stage
delivers the standard Cournot outcome described in Section 2 with equilib-
rium output and prot given by (16). If rm owners decide instead to del-
egate, in the second stage the managers of rms h = 1; :::; n simultaneously
3This simple contract would not be the optimal contract if rm owners were allowed
to choose the weights attached to own and average industry prots in the managers com-
pensation. In this case, as shown by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Miller and Pazgal
(2001) in a two-rm setup, the optimal weights would depend on demand parameters. We
do not allow rms owners to choose weights but only to decide between no delegation and
delegation via our simple prot-based RPE contract.
4This could be justied by inroducing a common additive shock a¤ecting rmsprots
as in Aggarwal and Samwick (1999). The shock would make it impossible to perfectly
infer the managers noncontractible action choice from prot. We prefer to leave this
justication implicit in order to streamline the presentation.
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choose output qh so as to maximize wh. In particular, given (2) the manager
of rm h maximizes
wh = kh +  (  qh   Q) qh  
Pn
z=1  (  qz   Q) qz
n
;
with FOC
 [  (2 + ) qh  Q]   (  2qh   2Q)
n
= 0 (29)
In the rst stage, owners of rms h = 1; :::; n simultaneously choose kh
so as to maximize h   wh, compare prot under the prot maximizing
delegation contract kh with prot under Cournot, and decide whether to
delegate or not. As the market for managers is competitive, khs are chosen
so that the managers are held to their reservation wage w0. After imposing
symmetry Q = nq, (29) can then be solved for output and prot under
delegation to yield
qd =

2 + n
and d =
2
(n + 2)2
: (30)
Comparing (30) with (15) reveals that strategic delegation under the sim-
plest prot-based RPE contract leads to the same outcome as strategic ne-
glect of the aggregate impact of rmsindividual output choices. Hence, we
can state:
Proposition 3 Consider an industry in which n rms compete by choosing
the output levels of their di¤erentiated products. Firms can decide whether
or not to delegate output decision to managers through a contract in which
managerscompensation is based on their prot performance relative to in-
dustry average. Dene nL  1 + 2
p
 + 1 and nH  1 +

1 + 2

p
 + 1.
Then, for 1 < n < nL there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in
pure strategies in which all rms do not delegate. For n > nH there exists
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in which all rms
delegate. For nL  n  nH there are two subgame perfect equilibria in pure
strategies, one in which all rms delegate and the other in which all rms do
not.
Hence, Propositions 2 and 3 together imply:
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Corollary 4 Consider an industry in which n rms compete by choosing the
output levels of their di¤erentiated products. A game in which rms decide
whether or not to take into account the e¤ect of their individual choices on
aggregate output is isomorphic to a game in which they decide whether or
not to delegate output choices to managers with compensation based on own
prot performance relative to industry average.
An interesting implication concerns the literature on the divisionaliza-
tionof multi-product rms (see, e.g., Baye et al., 1996; Ziss, 1998). The
creation by a multi-product rm of divisionsthat compete independently
in the market each peddling its own product can be seen as a commitment
to disregard aggregate dependence. Divisionalization entails pros and cons,
but the strategic incentive for the rm to divisionalize rests on its commit-
ment to more aggressive behavior, which increases the rms market share
at the expenses of its rivals. A model in which divisionalization can arise as
the optimal choice for a big (oligopolistic) rm that competes with a fringe
of small monopolistically competitive rivals is proposed by Kokovin et al.
(2014). In their model, depending on demand parameters, the big rm may
nd it convenient to be broken down into horizontal prot-maximizing divi-
sions that behave like monopolistically competitive units. Corollary 4 then
implies that divisionalization can be implemented by rm owners through
managerial contracts based on relative prot performance.
5 Conclusion
We have modeled the endogenous emergence of market structure in an indus-
try where a discrete number of rms compete by choosing the output levels
of their di¤erentiated products. In making this choice, they can strategically
decide whether or not to consider the impact of their individual decisions on
aggregate output.
We have shown that there exist two threshold numbers of rms such that:
when the number of rms in the industry falls below the lower threshold,
there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in which
all rms take the aggregate impact of their individual choices into account
as in standard oligopoly; when the number of rms falls above the higher
threshold, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in
which all rms disregard their aggregate impact as in standard monopolistic
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competition; when the number of rms falls between the two thresholds,
there are two subgame perfect equilibria in pure strategies, one in which all
rms consider their aggregate impact and the other in which they do not.
In terms of comparative statics, we have found that the lower threshold
decreases with the relative importance of aggregate output for individual rm
prot as dictated by product di¤erentiation and the gradient of marginal cost.
In particular, if product di¤erentiation is weak and marginal cost does not
increase steeply with production, oligopoly emerges as the unique equilibrium
market structure only when the number of rms is very small. The relation
between the higher threshold and the relative importance of aggregate output
is, instead, U-shaped.
We have also shown that our model of strategic inattentionis isomor-
phic to a model of strategic delegationof output choices by rm owners
to managers in which managerial compensation is based on relative prot
performance. Accordingly, even in the presence of only few rms, strategic
delegation can lead to the emergence of monopolistic competition as the
equilibrium market structure by de facto implementing strategic inatten-
tion. In this respect, one should observe less delegation based on relative
prot performance in industries characterized by the presence of few rms,
strong product di¤erentiation and steep marginal cost.
Three nal comments are in order. First, only with mixed strategies we
have been able to generate equilibrium outcomes in which some rms con-
sider while others neglect their aggregate impacts. These mixedoutcomes
may be quite relevant in practice and would be easy to generate with pure
strategies if one allowed for rm heterogeneity and rational inattentiondue
to costly information acquisition and processing. Whether this would also
be possible with strategic inattentionin the absence of any cost of acquir-
ing and processing information is an interesting direction of future research.
Second, we have considered strategic inattentionand strategic delegation
with relative performance evaluation in the case of single-product rms. It
may be interesting to extend the analysis to the case of multi-product rms
that can choose whether to neglect the individual impact of a product out-
put on rm or industry total output. Third, our analysis has been based
on a static model. A dynamic approach could be used to investigate on the
intertemporal dimension of strategic inattention.
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